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INDIGENOUS PEOPLE: AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE
ON THE CASE FOR ENTRENCHMENT OF
MAORI RIGHTS IN NEW ZEALAND LAW
Jeanette Jameson
Abstracr The 1840 Treaty of Waitangi, signed by representatives of the British
Crown and Maori Tribes, created a partnership that allowed colonization of New Zealand
while protecting the Maori culture. The Treaty was declared a "nullity" in an 1877 court
decision, and Maori rights under the Treaty have yet to be fully realized. Since the
beginning of the 1970s, the New Zealand government has increasingly recognized the
Maori culture. This Comment explores the history of the relationship between the Maori
people and the New Zealand government. It analyzes current government policy on
Maori issues. Fimally, it advocates for legislative entrenchment of Treaty rights to ensure
protection of the Maori culture and provide redress for past and future grievances
between the Treaty partners.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the Maori language, "Waitangi" means "pool of tears."1
Throughout the history of New Zealand, the signing of the Treaty of
Waitangi has created a literal "pool of tears" for Maori people, washing
them to the lowest levels of New Zealand society.2 Many Maori have
adopted the Treaty as their "bill of rights."3 Yet when Queen Elizabeth
visited Waitangi to celebrate the 150th anniversary of the Treaty, the New
Zealand police had to take great pains to protect the Queen from a Maori
salute, whakapohane, which involves the baring of ones' buttocks to
communicate strong dissatisfaction.4
The precise legal position of the Treaty in New Zealand is unclear.
The controversy over what the Treaty means is nearly as confusing as the
controversy over what it ought to mean. Debate is ongoing among New
Zealand legal scholars as to how the Treaty fits into New Zealand's
1 Peter Walker, Pool of Tears in the Antipathies; Today the Queen is Attending a Strange Birthday
Party in New Zealand, THE INDEPENDENT, Feb. 6,1990, at 17.
2 Ka Awatea: Report of the New Zealand Maori Commission, Part 3: The Position of Maori in
Societ 12 (1989).Y"This hui is suspicious of the passing of a Bill of Rights because we believe we already have one,
i.e. the Treaty of Waitangi." David V. Williams, The Constitutional Status of the Treaty of Waitangi: An
Historical Perspective, 14 N.Z.U. L. REV. 9, 13 (1990) (quoting the resolutions of the Turangawaewae
hui).
4 Protesters Toss Eggs, Score Direct Hit; Queen Not Laughing At Yolks, L.A. TImS, Feb. 24, 1986,
pt. 1, at 2.
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constitutional framework. Maori people strongly feel the implications of the
debate, especially in an age when indigenous peoples' rights are receiving
international attention. The problem is not likely to just go away. A
demographer has predicted that if current birth rates continue, one fourth of
New Zealand's people will be Maori within 30 years.S
This Comment looks at the ongoing argument from an American per-
spective. First, it looks at the Treaty from its origin and on through the
changes in Treaty policy initiated by the Waitangi Tribunal in the 1980s. It
then assesses the practical measures already implemented to address the
problems of the Maori in New Zealand. Finally, it analyzes the problems
arising from current government policy with respect to Treaty principles and
looks at potential ways to address those problems. It is not the intent of this
Comment to advocate constitutional reform in New Zealand, and especially
not to urge New Zealanders to duplicate the United States system. Rather, it
urges New Zealanders to explore the practical aspects of instituting reforms
that better meet the needs of the Maori in the areas of Treaty promises, the
policy statements of the New Zealand government, and international
concepts of justice for indigenous peoples.
"[[. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES
Exploring the position of Maori people in their homeland from the
signing of the Treaty through the history of its legal interpretation provides
more questions than answers. Far from a simple document, the Treaty has a
dual nature in both its substance and its philosophy. Two inconsistent ver-
sions exist, one in English and one in Maori. The Treaty of Waitangi is
really two Treaties, making consistent legal interpretation nearly impossible.
Although the Treaty's intent may have been to bring its partners together,
this duality has polarized Maori and English interests. Maori claimants
citing their plain language interpretation of Treaty concepts have been
continually frustrated in New Zealand courts. Inconsistency has fueled the
debate. Many people feel that Maori and non-Maori interests are
irreconcilable. 6
5 David Clark Scott, New Zealand's 'Experiment' in Righting Racial Wrongs, CHRIuSIAN SCIENCE
MONrrOR, Mar. 24, 1988, at 1-15.
6 Charles P. Wallace, Maoris Get Property and Fishing Rights, Sparking White Backlash; Land
Dispute Highlights Racial Issue in New Zealand, L.A. TIES, Aug. 18, 1989, pt. 1, at 2.
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A. The Treaty of Waitangi
The text of the Treaty of Waitangi consists of an English and a Maori
language version. The legislature has acknowledged that the terms of the
two versions are inconsistent.7 Representatives of the Crown and a handful
of Maori tribes ceremonially signed the Treaty at Waitangi in February of
1840.8 Captain William Hobson, who negotiated the Treaty on behalf of the
British Crown, proclaimed British sovereignty over New Zealand "by virtue
of the Treaty's cession of all rights and powers of sovereignty absolutely and
without reservation."9 Following the Waitangi meeting, Hobson and his
representatives carried copies of the Treaty to other sites in the North Island
and South Island of New Zealand, eventually obtaining the signatures of
over 500 Maori chiefs.10
1. Two Treaties, Two Meanings
The English version of the Treaty, which Parliament accepted in the
Treaty of Waitangi Act of 1975, echoes the terms of Hobson's proclamation.
The first article of the Treaty cedes sovereignty, without reservation, to the
Crown. The second article guarantees full exclusive and undisturbed
possession of lands and estates, forests, fisheries and other properties to the
Maori. The third article extends the protection of the Crown to the natives,
along with all rights and privileges as British subjects.
The Maori version of the Treaty, also incorporated into the 1975 Act,
expresses a very different view of sovereignty. The first article grants
kawanatanga to the Crown. The general translation of kawanatanga is
"government, or governance." l The Maori concept of kawanatanga is not
sovereignty, but rather a grant of police power over European settlers.
12
The Maori retain rangatiratanga, or chieftainship, 13 under the second
article of the Treaty. Rangatiratanga implies a partnership arrangement
under which the Crown governs New Zealand, and the Maori govern them-
7 "[W]hereas the text of the Treaty in the English language differs from the text of the Treaty in the
Maori language...." Treaty of Waitangi Act, N.Z. STAT. No. 114, at 825 (1976).
8 Williams, supra note 3, at 24.
9 Id.
10 CLAUDIA ORANGE, THE TREATY OF WArrANGi60-91 (1987).
11 Id. at 268 (glossary).
12 Jane Kelsey, Economic Libertarianism versus Maori Self-Determinatlon: Aotearoa/New Zealand
in Crisis, 18 INfl J. Soc. L. 239, 240 (1990) (defining kawanatanga as "a subordinate power aimed
primarily at achieving law and order amongst Pakeha [European] settlers.").
13 ORANGE, supra note 10, at 268 (glossary).
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selves. The division of sovereignty implied by kawanatanga and rangati-
ratanga is inconsistent, therefore, with the cession of sovereignty without
reservation expressed in the English version. The second article also
protects taonga (treasures) 14 of Maori people. Unlike the specific property
and land use rights detailed in the English version, taonga to the Maori has
intangible as well as tangible aspects.15 In a legal system based on property
and ownership, it is difficult for Maori claimants to allege losses of
intangible aspects of culture.
The third article of the Maori text grants te tiakitanga o te kuini o
ingarani, or her Majesty's royal protection,16 to the tribes. Historical evi-
dence indicates that the chiefs' main concern was protection from the
English settlers, especially when it came to Maori lands and customs. 17
2. Legal Controversy Over the Two Treaty Versions:
When New Zealand courts have recognized the Treaty, they usually
quote the English language version. A strong argument exists, however, for
considering the Maori language version "the Treaty" and the English "the
translation." 18 During the time of signing the Treaty, the Maori version re-
mained constant, while representatives of the Crown took at least five differ-
ent English texts to the various signing sites. 19 The Waitangi Tribunal, cre-
ated to interpret the Treaty, recommended that in the event of a conflict the
Maori text should prevail.20 This follows the Indian law rule in the United
States and Canada that courts should interpret treaties as the tribes under-
stood them at the time they were made.21 Statutes that are ambiguous or
conflicting with a treaty are to be interpreted in favor of the aboriginal peo-
ple.22 The suggestion of the Waitangi Tribunal is not binding, however, and
in New Zealand courts have only such powers as are explicitly granted by
14 Id.
15 Id. at 250 (defining Taonga as "valued customs and possessions").
16 P.G. McHugh, The Role of Law in Maori Claims, N.Z. LJ. 16,18 (1990).
17 ORANGE, supra note 10, at 64-65.
18 Id. at 85.
19 David V. Williams, Unique Relationship between the Crown and Tangata Whenua in WAITANGI,
MAORi AND PAxEHA PERSPECTIVES 76 (I.H. Kawharu ed., 1989) (in the Maor language, Tangata Whenua
means literally "The People of the Land").
20 The tribunal relied on "rules of international law, the contra preferentum rule and Canadian and
US precedents." R.P. Boast, New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney General: The Case of the Century?
N.Z. LJ. 240,243 (Aug. 1987).
21 Ralph Johnson, Fragile Gains: Two Centuries of Canadian and U.S. Policy Toward Indians, 66
WAsH. L. REv. 643,657 (1991).
22 Id.
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Parliament. 23 The Treaty is legally relevant only where a statute in question
explicitly contains the provision that interpretation must be consistent with
Treaty principles. 24 Even then, the court has broad discretion to interpret
Treaty principles and interests.23 No rule requires interpretation consistent
with Maori understanding or the concepts expressed in the Maori language
Treaty.
The major difference between the two versions of the Treaty is that
the English version transfers sovereignty, while the Maori version indicates
shared sovereignty.26 This inconsistency has sparked controversy over
whether the Treaty ceded absolute sovereignty to the Crown. The issue of
cession, however, is a difficult point to press 150 years after the fact. The
Crown has taken absolute sovereignty over New Zealand, regardless of
whether or not it was ever granted.27 It is unrealistic to expect the govern-
ment to renegotiate sovereignty, but damages and reparation are available to
some extent as a practical compromise.
Negotiated or court awarded monetary compensation has provided
reparation for historic losses in the United States and Canada.28 The New
Zealand policy has begun to develop along similar lines. For example, the
Ngati Whatua tribe and the Crown negotiated for more than three years be-
fore coming to an agreement on 80 acres of land at Bastion Point, near
Auckland.29
A very few scholars continue, however, to raise the old argument that
the Treaty is irrelevant because the Acts of Parliament that annexed New
Zealand to New South Wales secured sovereignty. 30 Tracing sovereignty
through a series of Acts, a New Zealand court recently found justification to
dismiss a Maori challenge.31 Another court, however, found that the Treaty
has a significant position as a source of New Zealand law.32 Without
23 "The Treaty of Waitangi was in issue only because of the statutory references to it made in the
State-Owned Enterprises Act itself." Boast, supra note 20, at 240.
24 Id.
25 Sir Kenneth Keith, The Treaty of Waitangi in the Courts, 14 N.Z.U. L. Rav. 37,58 (1990).
26 L.L Kawhau, Introduction in WArrANG!, MAORS AND PAKEHA PaERsPEcrtVs, supra note 19, at
Xvii.
27 "The tribunal was by then talking of a cession of sovereignty and rights of Pakeha settlement
'which cannot now be denied'." Kelsey, supra note 12, at 250.
28 Johnson, supra note 21, at 679-80.
29 Charles P. Wallace, Maoris Get Property and Fishing Rights, Sparking White Backlash, Land
Dispute Highlights Racial Issue in New Zealand, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1989, at 1-12.
30 David V. Williams, The Annexation of New Zealand to New South Wales in 1840: What of the
Treaty of Waitangi. 3 AUSTRAIAN J. L. & Soc. ANN. 41,45 (1985).
1 Berkett v. Tauranga District Court, 3 N.Z.L.R. 206 (1992).
32 "The Treaty of Waitangi is part of the fabric of New Zealand society and that it is proper to
resort to the Treaty as extrinsic material called in aid to interpret the provisions of any legislation, whether
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legislative guidance, inconsistent application of the Treaty in the courts is
unavoidable. Historical reverence for the Treaty coupled with government
responses to Treaty concerns, such as the establishment of the Waitangi
Tribunal, prove that the Treaty is not irrelevant in the eyes of most New
Zealanders. Maori people, arguably, have a special constitutional status
because the Treaty marked the beginning of constitutional government in
New Zealand.33
B. Assimilation of the Maori Culture
As conflicts arose between the two peoples in New Zealand, the gov-
ernment developed policies designed to assimilate the Maori culture into
that of the European settlers. Hobson assured the Maori chiefs who signed
the Treaty that lands unfairly taken would be returned, that the Crown
would not forcibly take land, and that the Queen might purchase land from
the Maori.34 He established the official office of "Protector of the
Aborigines" to ensure fair negotiation of these land sales. Captain George
Grey abolished the office soon after he became Governor in 1846, however,
establishing in its place a "Commissioner for the Extinguishment of Native
Title."35 The Colonial Secretary, Lord Nelson, admonished Grey to
consider the Treaty valid and binding. The courts reinforced this view of
the Treaty in the 1847 decision, The Queen v. Symonds.36 Grey nevertheless
ordered the invasion of the Waikato Maori settlement in 1863, beginning the
Land Wars, which lasted until 1872 and led to the unlawful seizure of
thousands of acres of land.37 Maori who refused to move from confiscated
lands were arrested and held without trial.38 The Maori attempted to take
recourse through legal channels, filing over one thousand petitions to the
General Assembly in the 1880s for return of their lands.39 The courts
or not there are specific legislative references to the Treaty or to Maori values." D. V. Williams, Maori
Issues II, N.Z. RECENT L. REv. 129, 131 (1990) (quoting Huakina Development Trust v. Waikato Valley
Authority, 2 N.Z.L.R. 188 (1987)).
33 Pita Rikys, Trick or Treaty? Validity of English Law in New Zealand and the Application of the
Treaty of Waitangi, N.Z. LJ. 370,370 (Oct. 1991).
4 ORANGE, supra note 10, at 46-47, 65.
35 PAULTEMMQ.C., THE WAfTANGITRIBUNALU THE CONSCIENCE OFTHE NATION 19 (1990).
36 Id. at 19.
37 Id. at 23.
38 Id. at 24.
39 ORANGE, supra note 10, at 186.
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quashed these hopes by upholding an 1877 decision that declared the Treaty
a legal nullity.40
Maori hopes continued to decline throughout most of the next century
as the government's refusal to abide by Treaty promises ensured that Maori
concerns ranked below those of the European settlers. Many Maori lost
their cultural identity, becoming trapped at the lowest economic levels of
colonial society.41
Even with such justifiable anger and despair, however, the Maori
threat of a "twenty-one bum salute" to the Queen never materialized. On the
150th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty at Waitangi, an estimated
one-fourth of the total Maori population took part in building or restoring
twenty-one war canoes to commemorate the Maori discovery of New
Zealand.42 The ceremony became a demonstration of Maori pride, not
Maori protest. Government reforms revived hope, beginning with the
establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal in 1975.43 Statutory recognition of
the Treaty and of Maori concerns followed, indicating an increasingly
effective Maori political movement in New Zealand.44
C. The Waitangi Tribunal
Established in 1975 by the Treaty of Waitangi Act,45 the Waitangi
Tribunal heard its first case in 1977. The claim was summarily dismissed,
arousing suspicions in the Maori community.46 The Tribunal's purpose was
to interpret the Treaty and to apply Treaty principles in recommending reso-
lution of Treaty claims.47 Reconvened in 1980 with a Maori chairman,
Judge Edward Taihakeirei Durie, the second Tribunal sat as a three member
panel composed of Judge Durie, Sir Graham Latimer, and Paul Temm
40 "The alleged treaty with the Bishop of New Zealand, if it ever existed, was a legal nullity, the
right of extinguishing the native title being exclusively in the Crown." Wi Parata v. Bishop of Wellington,
3 N.Z. Jur. R. (NS) S.C. 72,76 (1877).
41 Vernon Loeb, Maoris of New Zealand at Last are Getting Their Due, PHIL. INQUIn, Apr. 27,
1990, at A19.
42 Id.
43 See infra notes 45-51 and accompanying text.
44 Frank Viviano, Maoris Stake Claim to 'God's Country', Native Movement a Potent Force in State
Affairs, S.F. CHRON., May 11, 1988, at 2, ZI.
45 Treaty of Waitangi Act, N.Z. STAT. No. 114 (1975).
46 Maori feared the Tribunal was "another Pakeha [European] trick." TamsD, supra note 35, at 6.
47 The Act states the Tribunal's duties to "make recommendations on claims relating to the practical
application of the principles of the Treaty and, for that purpose, to determine its meaning and effect and
whether certain matters are inconsistent with those principles." Treaty of Waitangi Act, supra note 45, at
825.
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Q.C.48 Amendments to the Act in 1985 and 1988 increased the Tribunal
membership to its current sixteen judges, with a quorum of four required to
hear claims. The Tribunal can now conduct more than one hearing at a
time.49
To encourage Maori faith in the Tribunal, Judge Durie and his panel
devised procedures to incorporate Maori custom.5 0 The original Tribunal
met in a luxury hotel. The Tribunal now convenes at the tribal marae
(village squares or meeting halls) and follows tribal customs. Tribal leaders
ceremonially pass the mana (authority or prestige)5' of the marae to the
Tribunal before hearings. The Tribunal returns the mana to the tribe before
adjournment. The Tribunal conducts proceedings in the Maori language,
translated for the benefit of English-speaking judges and claimants. Durie's
panel conceived of the Tribunal as accessible, informal, and familiar to
Maori people.52
1. Tribunal Decisions that Shaped Policy
Four cornerstone decisions reached by the Tribunal from 1983 to
1987 laid the foundation for the legal benefits that the Maori have accrued
to date. The Motonui decision of 1983 upheld the claim by the Te Atiawa
tribe that discharging pollution near their traditional fishing grounds
violated Treaty principles. 53 The Tribunal characterized the Treaty as
placing an affirmative duty on the Crown, under contract theory, to protect
Maori interests.54 This characterization of a fiduciary relationship between
the Crown and the Maori established a basis for enforcing Treaty promises
under the common law.55
The Tribunal's Kaituna decision of 1984 explored the Treaty's
relationship to the laws of Parliament.5 6 The Tribunal declared that a
proposal to discharge effluent into the Kaituna river near a sacred pool (Te
Wai-i-rangi) of the Ngati Pikiao tribe constituted a violation of the Treaty.57
The Tribunal gave the Treaty the status of a statutory instrument, suggesting
48 TEMM, supra note 35, at 6.
49 Id. at 13-14.
50 TE m, supra note 35, at 7-12.
51 ORANGF, supra note 10, at 268 (glossary).
52 TaM, supra note 35, at 7-12.
53 Id. at 40.
54 Id. (calling the Treaty "a foundation for a developing commercial contract..
55 See discussion infra part M (A).
56 TEmm, supra note 35, at 46.
57 Id.
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that courts should interpret legislation by using the Treaty as a guide.Ss
Parliament adopted this recommendation in the State Owned Enterprises Act
of 1987.59 Justice Cooke interpreted the Act in New Zealand Maori Council
v. Attorney General, 2 N.Z.L.R. 142 (1989), to require consideration of
Maori claims before the Crown could transfer public land to private
enterprise.60
The Manukau Harbor report in 1985 had little practical effect because
at that time the Tribunal only had jurisdiction over claims of present harm.61
Even so, the Manukau Harbour report detailed for the first time, in an
official document the injustices suffered by the Maori in the Land Wars.62
The Tribunal found the acts of the British troops unjustified, and found that
the seizure of Maori property violated the Treaty.63 This finding may have
gained significance with the extension of jurisdiction back to 1840,64 if the
Maori bring claims to redress these losses. The Appeals court also recently
ruled that Tribunal reports are admissible even in actions where no statutory
mandate requires that they be considered. Courts can now admit Tribunal
reports under the hearsay exception for published books dealing with
matters of public history, anthropology or sociology.65 This opens the door
to Tribunal reports as persuasive, though not binding, legal authority.
The Manukau Harbour report also discusses the relationship between
kawanatanga (government) and rangatiratanga (chieftainship) in the Maori
text of the Treaty. The Tribunal found that rangatiratanga implied the
authority to control and manage.66  The Tribunal reasoned that the
partnership implications of this separation of sovereignty place the Crown
under an obligation to recognize Maori interests arising under the Treaty
and under an affirmative legal duty to protect those interests. 67
58 Id.
59 "Nothing in this Act shall permit the Crown to act in a manner that is inconsistent with the
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi." State Owned Enterprises Act, N.Z. STAT. No. 124 § 9 (1986).
60 Boast, supra note 20, at 244.
61 E.TJ. Durie, The Waitangi Tribunal: Its Relationship with the Judicial System, N.Z. LJ. 235, 237
(July 1986) (jurisdiction was made retroactive to 1840 by later amendment to the Act).
62 'The Manukau Maori jople were attacked without just cause by British troops, their homes and
villages ransacked and burned, their horses and cattle stolen. They were then forced to leave their lands and
treated as rebels, all their property being confiscated in punishment for a rebellion that never took place."
TalI msupra note 35, at 47 (quoting the Tribunal).9j d.
64 The Treaty of Waitangi Amendment Act, N.Z. STAT. No. 148 § 3 (1985).
65 Te Runanga o Muriwhenua Inc. v. Attorney General, 2 N.Z.L.R. 641 (1990) (reports admissible
under Evidence Amendment Act of 1980).
66 Kenneth A. Palmer, Law, Land and Maori Issues, 3 CANTURBURY L. REV. 322,345 n.106 (1988).
67 Id. at 343.
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The fourth cornerstone decision, the Tribunal report on Te Reo Maori
(1986), recommended that the government foster the Maori language as an
official language of New Zealand.68 The Tribunal urged Parliament to rec-
ognize the Maori right to use their native language in court proceedings and
government business. 69 The report stressed the importance of Maori culture
and its relationship to New Zealand's heritage.70 Parliament largely adopted
the Tribunal's findings in the Maori Language Act of 1987.71
2. The Changing Role of the Tribunal
The courts have further defined the principles of the Treaty of
Waitangi and the role of the Waitangi Tribunal. A recent pair of decisions
considered the role of the Waitangi Tribunal in the legal system. The first
decision held that a government agency bound by statute to act consistently
with Treaty principles must wait for the Tribunal's report before
implementing policy.72 This rule would benefit Maori claimants by
postponing government acts that might affect the property or other interest
in question until the Tribunal has considered the claim.
A second decision, arrived at a year later in the same action, eroded
the potential benefit for Maori claimants. The court held that compliance
with Treaty principles did not require immediate or substantial action, but
that acts of the government must not diminish the present capacity to protect
Treaty principles.73 The claim arose when the government proposed to sell
state-owned radio frequencies to private enterprise. The court agreed with
the Tribunal that the Crown had committed itself to protect the Maori
language under the Treaty. 74 The court found that a statutory reference to
the Treaty applied.75 It declared that broadcasting in the Maori language
was essential to preserve the language. 76 The court nevertheless dismissed
the appeal of the Maori council to prevent the transfer of broadcasting
68 "The Mao culture is unique in the world. Its carvings are rich in symbolism. Its music is
harmonious and appealing. Its dancing has captivated many hearts and its oral tradition is abundant in
song and story. There is a great body of 'oral literature' that has survived for many generations, full of
wisdom in its narrative and beauty in its poetry, and at the heart of it all is the Maori language ... 
TlEMMsupra note 35, at 54 (quoting the Tribunal report).Id.
70 Id.
71 Maori Language Act, N.Z. STAT. No. 176 (1987).
72 Attorney General v. New Zealand Maori Council, 2NZL.R. 129 (1991).
73 New Zealand Maori Council v. Attorney General, 2 N.Z.L.R. 576 (1992).
74 Id.
75 Id.76 Id.
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facilities under the State Owned Enterprises Act. 77 The court held that it did
not have the power to force the Crown to adopt policies simply because a
claimant had proved that such policies were a more appropriate means to
comply with Treaty obligations than other possible means.78 As long as the
government could find a substitute for the assets in question there was no
reason to compel the Crown to comply with what the Waitangi Tribunal, or
the Maori council, or even the court, deemed most appropriate.79 Courts
could interpret this decision to allow the government to postpone redress
even for legally acknowledged breaches of the Treaty as long as there was
some future capacity to effect reparation.
The work of the Waitangi Tribunal advanced the recognition of the
Treaty in New Zealand, but at this point no consensus exists as to the legal
effect of Tribunal decisions. As a means to redress Treaty injustices, the
Tribunal has been effective.80 No legal mandate, however, accompanies this
ability to effect government policy. The government has complied
voluntarily with the Tribunal's recommendations. The continued
effectiveness of such a system is questionable, however, leaving the Maori
vulnerable to the political changes of each election year.
The issue of Maori rights in New Zealand and the legal means to en-
force those rights has its roots in the language of the Treaty, but has also
been influenced by judicial interpretation and scholarly exploration of
common law rights of indigenous peoples. The following section examines
the implications of these views upon the Treaty and upon the Maori position
in New Zealand law.
III. MAORI RIGHTS
Waitangi Tribunal Judge Durie wrote in 1987 that to restore minimum
justice to the Maori would require reparation, tribal self-government, inde-
pendent economy, preservation of tribal culture, and state funding.8 1 These
imperatives parallel the relationship between Maori and the Crown envi-
sioned in the Maori language Treaty. Reparation would begin to heal the
losses of tangible taonga (treasures) such as tribal land. Self-government
embodies the concept of rangatiratanga (chieftainship). Independent econ-
omy would restore mana (authority, prestige) and assure continued rangati-
77 Id.
78 Id. at 588,602.
79 Id.
80 See infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
81 j Durie, Protection ofMinorities, NZ LJ. 260,260-61 (Aug. 1987).
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ratanga. The preservation of tribal culture incorporates the intangible
aspects of taonga such as rituals and customs. State funding is necessary to
restore justice to the Maori, especially since the state has failed to keep the
Crown's original promises. Current government policy, however, falls short
of even these "minimum" standards.
A. The Courts
Legal concepts supporting the restoration of justice to the Maori arise
from both the common law and the statutory recognition of the Treaty.
Maori rights under the Treaty are enforceable where Acts of Parliament
include a reference to the Treaty. Since the State Owned Enterprises Act,8 2
numerous other laws have incorporated references to Treaty principles.83
Court decisions under these statutes make reference to fiduciary duties
implied by the Treaty, although courts have explicitly linked their rulings to
the enabling statute. 84 However, under the common law doctrine of
aboriginal fiduciary obligation, a duty on the part of the government exists
even without a statutory reference to the Treaty.85  One court even
recognized the possibility that unextinguished aboriginal title may survive
over lands held by the Crown.86 No other court has gone so far, however,
and government policy continues to ignore even the existence of such an
argument.87 Whether any claim based on these precedents could survive in
a New Zealand court absent Parliamentary recognition of the Treaty remains
untested.
Under British law, treaties do not bind the courts unless Parliament
incorporates them into legislation as a part of domestic law.88 Treaties of
cession, however, differ in that they bind the executive directly, without
requiring legislation.8 9 Because New Zealand's highest court, the Privy
82 See supra note 59.
83 McHugh, supra note 16, at 16.
84 Boast, supra note 20, at 244.
85 McHugh, supra note 16, at 18.
86 Te Weehi v. Regional Fisheries Officer, 1 N.Z.L.R. 680 (1986).
87 "How many New Zealanders are aware of the Te Weehi case which recognizes that an unextin-
guished non-territorial aboriginal title may survive over Crown land? Or do we keep these tidbits hidden
amongst all the other little secrets underneath our gowns?" Nick Gerritsen, The Treaty of Waitangi: "do I
dare disturb the universe?", N.Z. LJ. 138, 139 (Apr. 1991).
88 W.K. Hastings, New Zealand Treaty Practice with Particular Reference to the Treaty of Waitangi,
38 IN'L & COMP. L.Q. 668, 668 (July 1989).
89 Treaties of cession "bind the Crown in its executive (as opposed to Parliamentary) capacity."
McHugh, supra note 16, at 17.
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Council, 90 has termed the Treaty of Waitangi a treaty of cession, the
common law provides a basis for enforcing breaches of the Treaty.91 Suits
against the Crown are therefore an appropriate means for enforcing Treaty
promises.
The Kauweranga Judgment, which found "rights in the nature of
contract flowing from the Treaty,"92 shows that there is judicial support for
this type of common law reparation. New Zealand courts have recognized
common law rights which could prevail over the doctrine of parliamentary
supremacy.93 Justice Cooke, one of the authors of the State Owned
Enterprises Act decision,94 characterizes the judiciary as "ready to do what
we reasonably can to allow fairness to have decisive weight in New Zealand
jurisprudence." 95 His dictum in another opinion is persuasive in this point:
"some common law rights presumably lie so deep that even Parliament
could not override them. "96
The support given by other judges to the doctrine of Parliamentary
supremacy tends to indicate, however, that common law arguments might
not be well-received or even heard. The court in Berkett v. Tauranga
District Court, 3 N.Z.L.R. 206 (1992) recently cited a 1974 British House of
Lords decision, holding that courts only have the power to interpret statutes;
the courts may not refuse to enforce them.97 According to such reasoning,
the Maori must seek their remedies from Parliament rather than the courts, a
difficult task because Maori interests have little representation in Parlia-
ment.98
The final problem in advancing common law arguments is that they
enforce Maori rights through collateral means, avoiding the question of
where the Treaty fits in New Zealand law.99 Successful common law
90 Hastings, supra note 88, at 676.
91 McHugh, supra note 16, at 17.
92 Kauweranga Judgment, republished at 14 V. U. OFWELLNrrON L. REV. 227 (1984).
93 See supra notes 85, 86 and accompanying text.
94 Attorney General v. New Zealand Maori Council, supra note 72.
95 Robin Cooke, Fairness (Treaty of Waitangi), 19 V. U. OF WE.LINGTON L. RLEV. 421, 433 (Nov.
1989)§6 Taylor v. New Zealand Poultry Board, 1 N.Z.L.R. 394,398 (1992).
97 "When an enactment is passed there is finality unless and until it is amended or repealed by Par-
liament. In the courts there may be argument as to the correct interpretation of the enactment: there must
be none as to whether it should be on the statute book at all." Berkett at 214 (citing Picklin v. BritishRailways Board, I ALLER 609,619 (1974)).
9 RJ. O'Connor, The Future of Maori Representation in Parliament, N.Z. LJ. 175, 176 (May
"No one pretends that the language of 'partnership' and 'fiduciary obligation' was exchanged on
the seaside promontory at Waitangi in 1840. The courts have stressed their construction of what amounts
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actions are better than a complete failure to enforce Maori rights, but will
not provide the stability and legal predictability that recognition of the
actual language of the Treaty would bring to the Maori. Before the
enactment of the Constitution Act, New Zealand scholars strongly
advocated entrenched constitutional recognition of the Treaty. 10o The
argument continued through the remainder of the 1980s as Parliament
debated over the Bill of Rights Act.101 The question of whether or not the
Treaty can or should be entrenched in New Zealand law revolves around the
issue of constitutional function in New Zealand.
B. The Constitution
Even if Parliament acknowledged the Treaty as a document of consti-
tutional importance in New Zealand, its legal status would still be uncer-
tain.102 Unlike the United States Constitution, New Zealand's constitution
does not operate as supreme law, and courts do not apply its provisions to
override inconsistent laws. For example, the New Zealand Constitution Act
of 1852 provided in Section 71 for the continuation of Maori customary law.
The Act provided that the government would set districts apart for the pur-
pose of preserving Maori customs. 103 This delegation of power to the Maori
never happened, and there was apparently no way to force the government
to enact the provisions of its own law.104
In 1986, the Constitution Act of 1987 was introduced and Parliament
was urged to consider incorporating the Treaty of Waitangi into the Act, and
to provide implementation for Section 71.105 Parliament did not follow
these suggestions. Instead, it repealed the customary law provision,
excluded the Treaty, and enacted the constitution itself only as statutory
law.106
to a contemporary mythology of the Treaty." P.G. McHugh, Constitutional Myths and the Treaty of
Waitangi, N.9. LJ. 316, 319 (Sept. 1991).
0 David V. Williams, The Constitutional Status of the Treaty of Waitangi. An Historical
Perspective, 14 N.Z.U. L. REV. 9 (June 1990).
101 See JEROME B. ELKIND AND ANTONY SHAW, A STANDARD FOR JUSTICE: A CRITICAL
COMMENTARY ON THE PROPOSED BILL OF RIGHTS FOR NEW ZEALAND (1986).
102 "The nature of the uncontrolled constitution, however, means that there is no simple definitive
answer to questions about the present constitutional status of the Treaty." Williams, supra note 30, at 29.
103 Customs were limited to those "not repugnant to the general purposes of humanity..." Alex
Frame, Colonising Attitudes toward Maori Custom, N. LJ. 105,106-07 (Mar. 1981).
104 Williams, supra note 100, at 22.
105 Id. at 23.
106 New Zealand Constitution Act, N.Z. STAT. No. 114 (1987).
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New Zealand's constitution consists of more, however, than the provi-
sions of the Constitution Act. Because the constitution is unentrenched, or
not supreme law, it operates on both written procedural and unwritten
common law levels.107 The unentrenched constitution is equal, in a legal
sense, to any other act of Parliament. 108 On the common law level,
however, courts use the constitution as a tool for statutory interpretation and
it may also influence the courts in other, unacknowledged ways. Through
the interpretation of statutes that refer to the Treaty and the common law
effect of the Treaty on court decisions, the Treaty has become
"constitutionalized."'109 Both the constitution and the Treaty operate in New
Zealand law in a similar fashion: the courts consider their principles yet
have no preemptive power to enforce them. The result is a system that is
slow to evolve and unresponsive to the concerns of its constituents.1 10 After
150 years the Maori are frustrated with waiting for movement on Treaty
issues.
Following the enactment of the Constitution Act of 1987, the proposal
for a Bill of Rights Act revived debate over entrenchment of the Treaty.111
Scholars argued that without the Treaty there was no legitimate basis for the
constitution. 1 2 The Bill of Rights could reconcile the conflicting concepts
of sovereignty in the two versions of the Treaty, creating a consistent legal
structure in New Zealand.1 13 Again the argument for entrenchment failed,
however, and the Bill of Rights was enacted as an ordinary statute without
including the provisions of the Treaty.
Because Parliament has entrenched neither the constitution nor the
New Zealand Bill of Rights as supreme law, the failure to entrench the
Treaty of Waitangi does not obviously discriminate against Maori interests.
In fact, with increasing recognition through the 1970s and 1980s, the Treaty
107 P.A. Joseph, The Apparent Futility of Constitutional Entrenchment in New Zealand, 10 N.Z.U.
L. RLV. 27,30 (June 1982).
108 Id.
109 Williams, supra note 30, at 23-29.
110 "Here judicial theory of the constitution serves two masters. On the one hand it seeks to account
for the constitutional system as it operates in fact, and on the other it substitutes for a written constitution in
seeking to reinforce the existing institutions legitimized in the course of events. Drawn by these
incongruous aims, English constitutional theory struggles to be contemporary and sensitive, yet tends to be
inertial and constraining." Joseph, supra note 107, at 36.
111 ELKIND AND SHAW, supranote 101, at41.
112 See F.M. Brookfield, The New Zealand Constitution; The Search for Legitimacy, supra note 19,
at 1.
113 "The legitimacy of the Constitution rests to a large extent on reconciling the authority of the New
Zealand Crown and Parliament, developed from the kawanatanga ceded in the first article of the Treaty...
with the rangatiratanga and mana of the Maori which should have been preserved under the second
article." Id. at 17.
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may occupy a position superior to these ordinary Acts. Without
entrenchment, however, these gains are the result of voluntary action by the
government, and there is no guarantee that the outlook for the Maori in New
Zealand will continue to improve.
C. Maori Sovereignty
Maori interests have made the least progress regarding the Treaty
promise of rangatiratanga (chieftainship). In the United States, the jurisdic-
tion of tribal courts recognizes aboriginal sovereignty. Although the system
has many flaws and Native Americans continue to fight against government
incursions into areas of sovereignty, tribal sovereignty is crucial to Indian
rights and culture. The Maori have never been able to carve out an area free
from the Crown's influence in New Zealand, despite Treaty promises and
enactments such as Section 71. The Crown continues to claim absolute
sovereignty, a condition that leaves little residual sovereignty for aboriginal
people.
If the legal sovereignty of the Crown is considered separately from
common law "popular or political sovereignty," which is vested in the
people, then there is room for an independent Maori government. 114 Under
such an independent government, tribal leaders would operate free from
government constraints in areas concerning only Maori, such as
management of tribal resources and tribal law on Maori land. A structure
for such Maori political sovereignty may be emerging under the policies of
the Runanga Iwi Act," 5 conceived to assist the process of devolution of
Maori social programs to iwi (tribal) agencies. The Runanga Iwi Act
established the Iwi Transition Agency to implement the transfer to
individual tribes of some of the administrative functions formerly the
province of the Department of Maori Affairs. 116 This is a significant step
toward Maori self-determination and recognition as a Treaty partner.117 The
Iwi Transition Agency, however, is only a beginning. Although the Act
provides that it should be interpreted consistently with the principles of the
114 "[Ihe traditional vocabulary of British constitutional theory provides the equipment to clarify
the relationship of rangatiratanga to our system of government." P.G. McHugh, Constitutional Theory and
Maori Claims, supra note 19, at 25, 47.
115 Runanga Iwi Act, N.Z. STAT. No. 125 (1990).
116 Id.
117 Tom O'Reilly and David Wood, Biculturalism and the Public Sector in RESHAPINo THE STATE:
NEw ZEALAND'S BUREAUCRATIC REVOLUTION 320,340 (1990).
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Treaty of Waitangi, many of its provisions cannot be reconciled with the
principle of Maori chieftainship.118
The most criticized section of the Act provides that the government,
rather than the tribal authorities, holds all power to define tribal agencies
and to determine the procedures they must follow. 119 The government also
controls the process of settling conflicts within and between tribes. 120
Although there are few gains for the Maori under the Act, the Crown
benefits in several ways. The government has power to limit, to monitor
and to define the tribal authorities. The government reduces costs by
delivering resources to tribal agencies to administer rather than
administering them through government funded agencies. Although the
Runanga Iwi Act may provide a starting point for recognition of the
rangatiratanga (chieftainship) Treaty principle, at present it is only a
framework for the fulfillment of the Crown's promise.
The New Zealand government, despite all the progress in the last
twenty years, continues to totter on the brink of recognizing the provisions
of the Treaty. Enactments such as the Runanga Iwi Act refer to principles,
rather than provisions. Reparation for some past injustices has been signifi-
cant, but the majority of Maori have not benefited. Finally, the Maori still
have no guaranteed legal means to redress past wrongs or to prevent future
erosion of the rights that have been acknowledged.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Reparation
The acts of the New Zealand government in the last twenty years
show an increasing sense of commitment toward healing the breach between
the two peoples that occupy its soil. There has been a significant change in
policy from assimilation to celebration of the Maori culture. The acts of the
government have made it impossible to go back to the policy of ignoring the
Treaty. Many issues remain unsettled, however, and the problem will grow
as the Maori population grows. The prediction that half of New Zealand's
people will one day be Maori is significant. If the government postpones
118 "The Bill, and indeed, the entire government policy of devolution in its current form are in
breach of the Treaty, in particular the guarantee of tino rangatiratanga in Part 2. It is clear that iwi will
continue to be subservient to the Crown in this new scheme." A.L. Mikaere, Maori Issues I, NZ. RECENT
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reparation, discontent on such a large scale could be catastrophic. Rifts of
over a hundred years' duration are not easily filled, and run deeper than they
first appear. The first healing must be in the area of trust.
1. "If you would restore the honour of the Pakeha .. 121
William Hobson and the Crown had honorable intentions when they
made a pact with the Maori to acquire New Zealand. 122 From an American
perspective, this is enviable, because the transactions of the U.S.
government with indigenous people had no such auspicious beginning.
123
The Crown seems to have intended to keep its treaty promises. The early
establishment of a "Protector of Aborigines" indicates an intent to prevent
the government and the European settlers from taking advantage of the
Maori in land transactions. Section 71 of the original Constitution Act
shows an intent to keep Maori customs alive and to establish districts of
Maori influence that may even have satisfied the Treaty concept of Maori
self-government. The relationship of the Maori and the Crown was
consistent with these good intentions until the time of the Land Wars.
Legislation from the Treaty of Waitangi Act to the present proves that
those good intentions have been revived. The government of New Zealand
has shown its intention to acknowledge the Treaty, to redress past injustices
and to transfer power to tribal authority. These intentions cannot be
fulfilled, however, without defining what will be done, how it will be
accomplished and when it will begin. There is an air of Maori expectancy
felt in the debate over the legal position of the Treaty of Waitangi in New
Zealand, but the hope that progress will continue is tainted by the shadow of
doubt: what will prevent the government from passing new laws that put
the Maori back where they were? Parliament created the Waitangi Tribunal,
and what the Crown gives it can also take away. Government promises to
the Maori are met with justifiable mistrust.
2. "you must first restore the mana of the Maori. " 124
At the time of the Treaty and the early years following its signing, the
Maori were a strong and numerous people. They had their own language,
laws, social customs and religious beliefs. They cultivated land, developed
121 TEMM, supra note 35, at 32.
122 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
123 See generally, FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER (1986).
124 THM, supra note 35, at 32.
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advanced fishing techniques and engaged in commerce. They had cultural
identities distinct from tribe to tribe, and celebrated their differences in art,
music and storytelling. All of these "treasures," taken together, form the
mana of the Maori.
The chiefs who signed the Treaty of Waitangi thought it would
protect the mana of their people. They made their marks beneath promises,
written by the English in the Maori language, that their land would be
protected, that they would retain the power to regulate their own lives, and
that their "treasures" would not be taken away. The promises of the Treaty
became a part of their mana. The Treaty was itself a treasure that the tribes
possessed. Even after the Crown dishonored the Treaty and broke its
promises, the Maori did not cease to value it.
The New Zealand government has returned some part of Maori treas-
ures. It has returned some lands and protected others. It has acknowledged
the Maori language and created a tribunal that follows Maori customs in its
procedure and provides a forum to air the grievances that New Zealand
courts do not recognize. These are all treasures, but they fall short of mana.
What is missing is a very important treasure: a sphere of power in which
each tribe can act independently in matters that do not affect outsiders, and a
sphere of influence in which each tribe can demand justice when acts of
outsiders adversely affect them.
The argument seems always to return to the Treaty. "The principles
of the Treaty of Waitangi" is a phrase that has become common in New
Zealand legislation. Obviously, in the interpretation of the New Zealand
government, this provision means something less than the literal terms of
the Treaty or the expectations of those who signed it. The Prime Minister
has even gone so far as to announce five major principles that form the basis
for these legislative references. 125 The extent to which these five principles
correspond with the Treaty itself, and the extent to which current and future
legislation reflects rights arising under these principles is the final focus of
this analysis. If the New Zealand government would restore honor to the
Crown, it must restore the mana of the Maori. The question is whether the
principles as stated have the potential to create an acceptable level of
reparation, honor the Treaty, and heal Maori trust.
125 Alex Frame, A State Servant Looks at The Treaty, 14 N7_ L. REV. 82, 86 (June 1990).
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B. The Crown's Policy Statement of Treaty Principles
The government policy statement of Treaty principles creates a frame
of reference for issues affecting the Maori. The principles address five areas
of concern. The first principle, Government, considers the question of sov-
ereignty. The second, Self-Management, addresses the need for a sphere of
independent Maori influence in areas affecting the tribes. The third and
fourth principles, Equality and Cooperation, look at the relationship of two
peoples in one land. The final principle, Redress, brings up the issue of
reconciling past and future conflict.
1. The Kawanatanga Principle / The Principle of Government
The first Article of the Treaty gives expression of the
right to the Crown to make laws and its obligation to govern in
accordance with constitutional process. This sovereignty is
qualified by the promise to accord the Maori interest specified
in the second Article an appropriate priority.
126
On its face, the first principle backs away from the statement of abso-
lute sovereignty seen in the English version of the Treaty, and therefore en-
courages the Maori. It takes into consideration the meaning of the Maori
treaty terms, acknowledges the Treaty promise of Maori self-government,
and makes two further promises: that Parliament will give this interest "an
appropriate priority" in making laws, and that the Crown will govern "in
accordance with constitutional process."
In light of the history of past promises, those concerned with Maori
interests should ask for further clarification of three major points. First, the
means of enforcing these obligations is not stated. Second, the Maori
definition of "appropriate" may differ from that of the Crown. Finally, the
term "constitutional process" is unclear. The courts and the legislature
cannot apply the principle consistently or in a practical manner unless these
issues are clarified. As stated, any number of interpretations are possible.
In light of the past relationship between the Maori and government, the
implications in these areas are not encouraging.
Promises by the government have not been scarce throughout the
history of the relationship between the Maori and the Crown. The Maori
continue to lack an adequate means to ensure that the government keeps its
126 Id. at 87 (quoting the text of the five principles).
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promises. The Kawanatanga principle continues to speak of obligation and
promise but never provides that means. As previous case law suggests, if
the Maori take these promises and obligations to court, the courts will
probably find that the remedy lies only in Parliament. The fact that Maori
constitute about ten percent of the current population signifies the amount of
influence they may reasonably be expected to exert upon the legislature.
Postponing the resolution of Treaty issues because the Maori population
may increase is irresponsible in both moral and fiscal implications.
Going to Parliament by way of the Waitangi Tribunal has been the
most effective means for Maori concerns to be acknowledged, because the
Tribunal has the advisory power to interpret Treaty principles. The fact that
the government has now made an official statement of Treaty principles is
ominous. Political pressure may influence the Waitangi Tribunal to concur
with the government's interpretation rather than to refer to the Treaty. Par-
liament may also choose the government interpretation over that of the
Tribunal in drafting legislation. Thus, not only does the government fail to
provide a legal means to enforce promises to the Maori, its statement of
principles may even weaken the persuasive effect of the Tribunal that is
currently the Maori's sole protection.
These concerns also point out that what Parliament or the Crown con-
siders to be appropriate is not necessarily going to be matched by the Tribu-
nal's views or by a majority of Maori people. Again, case law is significant.
In the radio frequencies case127 the court found that it was outside the court's
proper function to question whether or not the government's action was ap-
propriate.128 If the courts do not have the power to mediate between the
Crown and the Maori in determining what acts are appropriate, the Crown's
judgment will prevail.
The promise to act in accordance with constitutional process is not as
reassuring as the Prime Minister may have intended. It is not settled in New
Zealand law whether the Treaty or its principles are a part of the
constitution, so there is no guarantee that constitutional process will include
Treaty concepts, or any other representation of Maori interests as a minority
people.129
127 See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
128 Id. at 602.
129 This issue was also present at the time the United States Constitution was being formed. There
was much debate over the representation of minority interests in a democratic process primarily based on
majority rule. One of the main reasons that the U.S. Constitution was necessary was to prevent excessive
control of government by a "superior force of an interested and overbearing majority." The Federalist No.
10, 8 (James Madison) (reprinted in STONE. SEiDMAN, SuTEIN AND TusHNur, CoSTITuriONAL LAW
(2ed. Little, Brown and Co. 1991).
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Although New Zealand is not governed solely under democratic
theory, the popularly elected Parliament primarily reflects the interests of
the majority of voters and the views of the majority party in control at a
given time. As a constitutional monarchy, the executive protects minority
interests. The Maori have no power to compel the Crown to protect their
interests unless the Crown violates a basic, internationally recognized
human right sufficient to carry a claim to the Human Rights Committee of
the United Nations. 130 The Maori cannot rely upon the unenforceable
promise of government. They must rely on the honor of the Crown, a
prospect so tarnished by history that it is no guarantee at all.
2. The Rangatiratanga Principle / The Principle of Self Management
The second article of the Treaty guarantees to iwi Maori
the control and enjoyment of those resources and taonga which
it is their wish to retain. The preservation of a resource base,
restoration of iwi self management, and the active protection of
taonga, both material and cultural, are necessary elements of
the Crown's policy of recognizing rangatiratanga.131
The Self-Management principle appears to be a leap forward for
Maori interests. Finally, there is official recognition that the concept of
rangatiratanga forms a part of the Treaty. Upon closer analysis, however,
this principle appears to be a preemptive strike. The government defines the
Treaty terms according to the concessions that the government is willing to
make. Three issues remain problematic. First, the government definition of
rangatiratanga is unacceptable. Second, this principle gives the Maori
nothing more than they already had. Finally, this statement falls short of a
"guarantee" to the Maori.
The source of the government's definition resides in motivational
rather than linguistic analysis. Defining the Maori term rangatiratanga as
"self management" significantly reduces the impact of the generally
accepted translation: chieftainship. 132 Businesses, property owners and
private individuals already have the right to manage themselves. The
principle gives the Maori nothing more. The principle tailors its words to fit
130 Antony Shaw and Andrew S. Butler, The New Zealand Bill of Rights Comes Alive, NZ W. 400,
410 (Nov. 1991).
131 Frame, supra note 125, at 87.
132 See ORANGE, supra note 10, at 268 (glossary); see also 14 N.Z.U. L. REV. 102 (Dec. 1990)
(glossary) ("chieftainship, authority"); SHAW AND ELKIND, supra note 101, at 37 ("high chieftainship").
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the provisions of the Runanga Iwi Act, defining the Treaty concepts so
narrowly that the Act meets these concerns without requiring further effort.
According to its own principle, the government need do no more than hand
its programs to the tribes to administer, complete with government-
determined rules, regulations and procedures.
The principle further dilutes the language of even the English Treaty.
The "control and enjoyment of those resources and taonga which it is their
wish to retain" gives less than the English language in the Treaty: "[F]ull
exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates Forests
Fisheries and other properties which they may collectively or individually
possess .... ,"133 "Material" possessions are only those resources actually
owned or legally recognized, because the principle limits non-tangible re-
sources to cultural aspects. The principle does not address customary uses
of land, protection of sacred sites or hunting and fishing rights. It does not
make a commitment to restore lost resources or to provide an economic base
for tribal self-sufficiency. The principle promises active protection of
material and cultural resources, but again, how the Maori can enforce these
promises is not made clear in the principles and has not been clarified in
subsequent law.
The principle lists the preservation of a resource base as a concern,
but it does not say whether this protects the Maori interest or that of the
Crown. Recent legislation regarding the fisheries resource indicates that the
Maori will share the economic burdens of resource conservation. The Maori
Fisheries Act of 1989134 grants a significant quota of the total fishery to the
Maori, subject to conservation concerns of the government. The Act
provides for tribal control over some smaller specific areas. The Maori
Fisheries Commission must consult with tribal representatives and consider
Maori custom in granting fish quotas.135 However, traditional Maori fishing
practices have no priority under the Act. The Act goes no further and
possibly falls short of previous case law, which found that the Treaty
protected customary and traditional rights for the Maori, superior to those of
the general public. 136
133 Treaty of Waitangi Act, N.Z. STAT. No. 114 (1975).
134 Maori Fisheries Act, N.Z. STAT. No. 159 (1989).
135 Frame, supra note 125, at 93.
136 "If there is any feeling that it is somehow unjust that the Maori people should by their custom
and tradition have the right to take toheroa [a protected species] when others are absolutely prohibited from
doing so, then we need to remind ourselves that the Crown covenanted by the Treaty of Waitangi, on
behalf of the European settlers, that in return for the acceptance by the Maori people of the sovereignty of
the Crown their fishing rights ... should be protected and preserved to them." D. V. Williams, Maori
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The Maori Fisheries Act acknowledges Maori rights to an extremely
valuable resource, but remains a long step away from the Treaty principle of
chieftainship. Legislation passed after the release of the "principles" may
even erode Maori gains under the common law. If the Self-Management
principle is any indication, the government will not implement policies to
advance Maori independence in tribal law or tribal government.
The final issue under the second principle is the practical value to the
Maori of the Prime Minister's guarantee. Much of what the principle
guarantees the Maori already had, due either to previous legal gains or as a
general right in common with all citizens. If the principle offers anything
new, the Maori cannot ensure that they actually get it. This "guarantee" is
only a statement of policy, and has no legal enforceability. No further
legislation has provided concrete assurance. The government must be
willing to remove itself from power in the areas granted to the Maori for
self-government to keep the rangatiratanga promise. Specific legislation is
the only real guarantee.
3. The Principle of Equality
The third Article of the Treaty constitutes a guarantee of
legal equality between Maori and other citizens of New
Zealand. This means that all New Zealand citizens are equal
before the law. Furthermore, the common law system is
selected by' the Treaty as the basis for that equality although
human rights accepted under international law are incorporated
also.
The third Article also has an important social
significance in the implicit assurance that social rights would
be enjoyed equally by Maori with all New Zealand citizens of
whatever origin. Special measures to attain that equal
enjoyment of social benefits are allowed by international
law. 137
The Equality principle begins with the Treaty grant of royal
protection and all rights and privileges as British citizens to the Maori, but it
adds several new layers. The assertion that the Treaty selects the common
Issues II, N.Z. RECENT L. REV. 129, 132 (quoting Inglis, Q.C., Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries v.
Hakaria, D.C.R. 289 (1989)).
137 Frame, supra note 125, at 87.
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law system has no apparent roots in the actual language of the third article,
but it does not appear objectionable. "Social rights" is more confusing, but
the clue in the subsequent statement allows a guess. The principle may
intend to protect future legislation designed to enhance the status of
minorities (i.e., affirmative action in the United States) from the equality
objection.
Such programs are special measures to attain equal enjoyment of
social benefits. They would allow the government to restore the losses in
status that have economically disadvantaged the Maori as a group. If one
can extract from this principle a commitment to undertake such measures, it
is an encouraging response to the persuasive argument about the need for
evolutionary change in New Zealand's constitution. It also shows support
for international concepts of human rights for indigenous peoples. 138 Such a
characterization of the principle may be too optimistic, however, because
the principle does not state an express commitment that such special
measures will occur, or even that they should. The government may have
declared the Maori equal in order to preempt the courts from finding that
they are entitled to distinct group rights.
The Treaty of Waitangi may entitle the Maori to a special constitu-
tional status in New Zealand. The decision of the district court in
Hakaria,139 which recognized fishing rights for the Maori that were superior
to those of the general public, provides one concrete example of this status.
If the principle equalizes Maori rights in these areas with those of the
population at large, special rights already won would be eliminated. It
would also preclude any future recognition of the unique position that the
Maori, as aboriginal people, occupy. The equality principle could
jeopardize the attempt to establish areas of tribal influence in which Maori
customary laws can be given effect under the rangatiratanga principle.
Dampening the ability of the Maori to seek special recognition of
their laws and customs has cultural costs for all New Zealanders. The
existence of a separate system of customs and laws can allow a government
to evolve more easily, and make it more responsive. 140 An independent
138 "The theory and practice of the modem international law of human rights can reinforce our
resolution to do whatever may be needed to reduce, and finally to eliminate, margins of disadvantage
suffered by the Maori and islands peoples .... " R.Q. Quentin-Baxter, Themes of Constitutional
Development: The Need for a Favorable Climate of Discussion, N.Z. LJ. 203,207 (June 1984).
139 See supra note 136.
140 "It is this possibility of creative interaction between Maori customary concepts and Pakeha
law-a possibility unique in New Zealand-which is lost when, in accordance with an ill-conceived model
for "law", one system is exalted into unshakeable dominance and the other defined into darkness. If one of
the central problems of modem law systems is the gap between state law and the life of ordinary people...
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Maori system could address individual problems according to the practices
of tribal culture, while keeping the larger system informed. To the extent
that the principle of equality encourages cultural uniformity, it does not
benefit New Zealand. Equality destroys the possibility of independent
Maori customary law under the rangatiratanga principle.
Although the Government principle proposes to protect the Maori
culture, special recognition of Maori customary law helps define Maori cul-
ture. Assimilation nearly destroyed the Maori culture. Because of cultural
differences, it is difficult to frame Maori concerns and issues in terms of
mainstream legal concepts. 141 The principle must not equalize the Maori to
the extent that they lose special forums for Maori concerns, such as the
Waitangi Tribunal. Independent Maori control in areas that affect tribal
interests and a legal system that has the power to protect these interests are
crucial for the protection of Maori culture.
4. The Principle of Cooperation
The Treaty is regarded by the Crown as establishing a
fair basis for two peoples in one country. Duality and unity are
both significant. Duality implies distinctive cultural
development and unity implies common purpose and
community. The relationship between community and
distinctive development is governed by the requirement of
cooperation which is an obligation placed on both parties to the
Treaty.
Reasonable cooperation can only take place if there is
consultation on major issues of common concern and if good
faith, balance, and common sense are shown on both sides.
The outcome of reasonable cooperation will be partnership. 142
The fourth principle, Cooperation, recognizes the concept of partner-
ship implied in the Maori version of the Treaty, but places contingencies
upon the full recognition of the Maori as Treaty partners. The Maori must
then the existence in a culture of a system of customary law should be seen as a national asset, not as a
'problem' to be defined away." Alex Frame, Colonising Attitudes toward Maori Custom, N.Z. L. 105, 110
(Mar. 1981).
141 "[P]olicy makers and planners have consciously and unconsciously strived for cultural uniform-
ity in this country and in so doing have relegated things Maori into non-issues .... " John Tamihere, Te
Take Maori: A Maori Perspective of Legislation and its Interpretation with an Emphasis on Planning Law,
Vol. 5, No. 2 AuCKLAND U. L. Rev. 137, 138 (1985).
142 Frame, supra note 125, at 87.
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cooperate with the larger community, and the principle implies compromise
between the two interests. The principle contemplates the development of a
separate cultural identity for the Maori. The vision, however, has the Maori
cultural identity developing inside a unified community, becoming one
voice among many. The principle sees Maori and non-Maori as two
cultures, but not as separate influences in society. There is to be a common
purpose and single community.
There is an agreement of consultation, and a duty of good faith, bal-
ance and common sense placed on both parties. This indicates that where
the government seeks Maori views, it will take those views into account,
balancing them against other interests and considerations of practicality.
Balancing interests and moving toward practical common purposes appears
reasonable at first. Flaws in this reasoning appear, however, in light of the
fact that the Maori comprise a minority of about ten percent of New
Zealand's population.
Maori and non-Maori, with their cultural differences and past inequal-
ity, will seldom share common political purposes. The principles have
enough leeway to allow the breach of Treaty rights so long as there is
enough weight on the other side of the scale to justify such acts as benefiting
the larger community. When conflict arises the weight of the majority
interest will usually prevail. Outnumbered nine to one in the population, the
Maori will be more wary of "balancing" their interests against the greater
good than would have been the case at the time of the Treaty, when the
ratios were reversed. The terms of this principle are dangerously close to
the former policy of assimilation.
The cooperation principle echoes the message given to the Maori by
the courts. The promises of the Treaty and the injustices that resulted from
breaching those promises occurred in the past, but courts must find the rem-
edy in today's world. Claims based on Maori concepts of the Treaty have
been termed unfair and extravagant. 143 The principle of Cooperation does
not focus on the Treaty, Maori rights, or concepts of justice for indigenous
peoples. It focuses on practicality, avoiding government burdens, and
fairness for the population in general. Such a focus makes it difficult to
correct the margins of disadvantage that the Maori have suffered and
continue to suffer. Before cooperation can be effective, the advantages must
143 "Maori must recognise that.. . both the history and the economy of the nation rule out
extravagant claims in the democracy now shared. Both partners should know that a narrow focus on the
past is useless. The principles of the Treaty have to be applied to give fair results in today's world." Tainui
Trust Board v. Attorney-General, 2 N.Z.L.R. 513, 530 (1989).
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counteract the past inequity and reestablish economic and social influence
for the Maori.
The government statement of the Cooperation principle keeps the
Crown's obligations vague. The government never acknowledges the
obligation to make reparation, a crucial point in the same decision that urged
the Maori to let go of their extravagant claims.144 The Tainui court's
message to the Crown, that an obligation must be seen in order to be
honored, points out the greatest inadequacy in these principles and in New
Zealand law. There is no binding declaration of the Crown's present and
future obligations.
The Treaty of Waitangi is not embodied in the law. Legislation refers
only to the principles of the Treaty, and the government statement of those
principles will become a reference for the courts as well as the legislature.
The Waitangi Tribunal currently has the greatest responsibility for
answering Maori Treaty concerns, but it is not a legal body. Without a
commitment in these areas, the Crown's principles amount to little more
than the "lip service" criticized by the Tainui court. As long as the
government acts with honor, the Maori position will continue to improve.
Without guaranteed legal rights, the means to enforce those rights, and
protection from government interference, the Maori depend solely upon that
honor.
5. The Principle of Redress
The Crown accepts a responsibility to provide a process
for the resolution of grievances arising from the Treaty. This
process may involve courts, the Waitangi Tribunal, or direct
negotiation. The provision of redress, where entitlement is
established, must take account of its practical impact and of the
need to avoid the creation of fresh injustice. If the Crown
demonstrates commitment to this process of redress then it will
expect reconciliation to result. 145
144 "It is obvious that ... non-Maori have to adjust to an understanding that does not come easily to
all: reparation has to be made to the Maori people for past and continuing breaches of the Treaty by which
they agreed to yield government. Lip service disclaimers of racial prejudice and token acknowledgments
that the Treaty has not been honoured cannot be enough. An obligation has to be seen to be honoured." Id.
at 530.
145 Frame, supra note 125, at 87-88.
VOL. 2 No. 2
NEW ZEALAND'S TREATY OF WAITANGI
The final principle, Redress, is perhaps the most hopeful. It
recognizes that rights are meaningless without the means to enforce them,
and that legitimate grievances exist. The Tainui court suggested negotiation
as a more appropriate means than legal action for restoring Maori lands.146
The legislature has taken the recommendations of the Waitangi Tribunal
into account even though there was no mandate to do so. This strongly
indicates that the legislature will continue to act in good faith in considering
the Tribunal's advice. Tribunal recommendations may become a negotiating
tool for the Maori who chose to take their claims to the government rather
than the courts.
The obvious question, however, is what effect "accepting
responsibility to provide a process" will have in enforcing the guarantees of
the other principles, the rights under the Treaty currently recognized, and
unrecognized interests such as independent tribal government. Since the
principle lists direct negotiation as an acceptable process, the willingness to
negotiate may, without more, be sufficient to satisfy this responsibility.
Negotiation is a voluntary exchange, and without recognized legal
rights and remedies, the Maori have little bargaining power. The Waitangi
Tribunal has no binding legal influence. The courts must provide a legal
remedy only where the legislature has granted them jurisdiction. The
Berkett decision demonstrates that a court can dismiss general claims under
the Treaty. 147 The argument, like the Maori claimant, comes full circle,
always winding up back where it started: the lack of a remedy.
Under the current system, the Maori have no codified rights as an
indigenous people. As a minority people, they have no influence where the
majority rules. The areas over which they can exert control are only those
voluntarily ceded to them by the legislature. 148  The measures of
improvement that have occurred without a legal mandate affirm the honor
and fairness of the Crown, Parliament and the people of New Zealand.
Passing legislation to guarantee Maori rights would show that the Crown is
committed to continuing that honor and fairness.
In order to permanently restore the mana of the Maori, there must be
more than material gains. Instituting social programs to benefit the Maori,
146 See supra notes 143-144.
147 See supra notes 31, 97 and accompanying text.
148 'We are committed to government by the consent of the governed; and that consent is based
upon reason and habit. To satisfy reason, we have to provide better means for the people to evaluate the
actions and processes of government and we have to be able to show that these actions and processes
embody a sense of fairness. To satisfy habit, we must ensure that change is evolutionary--that our insti-
tutions are true to their own spirit, even while they are changing." Quentin-Baxter, supra note 138, at 207.
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or awarding money or property in restitution, returns only a part of what the
Maori lost. Mana encompasses the concepts of pride, independence and
control. These treasures cannot be restored if the Maori must beg at the
government's table, regardless of how many millions of dollars worth of
scraps are distributed. The Maori are justified in viewing the government's
commitment to fairness with skepticism unless and until they have both
guaranteed rights and the means to enforce them.
V. CONCLUSION
Canada has codified aboriginal rights as a part of its constitution, en-
trenched as supreme law and subject to judicial review.149 The lack of simi-
lar protections in New Zealand, therefore, is not a function of the British
legal system. Placing the Constitution, Bill of Rights, or Treaty of Waitangi
beyond the ability of Parliament to tamper with them as ordinary Acts must
go against the grain for the independent-thinking New Zealander. Even the
progressive government of the 1980s stopped on the brink of this action.
A major reason that New Zealand has not codified Maori rights is the
Treaty of Waitangi itself. Both the Constitution and Bill of Rights Acts pro-
posed incorporating the text of the Treaty as the declaration of rights for the
Maori. The possible difficulty of interpreting and enforcing the Treaty as a
legal instrument became a persuasive argument for holding back.150 Even if
it is conceded, however, that the Treaty would be unwieldy as a piece of
legislation, it does not follow that Maori rights under the Treaty cannot or
should not be entrenched. Parliament can draft legislation to restore the
rights and powers that the Maori intended to reserve under the Treaty, and to
limit government interference in the future. Judge Dune's minimum justice
factors 151 can offer guidance in drafting such legislation, as can the
government principles, and the Treaty itself.
The problems outlined above have not been solved by the half-meas-
ures undertaken to date. It is difficult for the Maori to trust a government
that seems so unsure of its own position. Parliament continues to draft the
term "the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi" into legislation. The
149 Johnson, supra note 21, at 682-83.
150 "The Treaty [quite apart from the fact that its Maori and English versions may not entirely co-
incide] is by its very nature vague and uncertain. Whether the Treaty is capable of legal application is open
to grave doubt. That is not to depreciate its symbolic value or great importance in New Zealand history.
The mistake is suddenly to accord it a legal status for which it was never intended and for which it is
plainly unfitted." Guy Brougham Chapman, A Bill of Wrongs: The Argument Against the Proposed Bill of
Rights, N.Z. LJ. 226,230 (July 1985).
151 See generally Dune, supra note 81.
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government statement of those principles, however, is a vague and uncertain
place to hang the hat of Maori trust. The government's principles back away
from the fulfillment of the original Treaty promises, and from the new hopes
that arose from the hard won gains of the last decade.
To demonstrate its commitment toward fulfilling the Treaty to the
greatest practical extent, Parliament must be willing to return to the Maori
the rights and powers that the signing chiefs intended to reserve.
Practicality can limit the initial rights and powers granted, to expand and
evolve as conditions change. To meet the standards of minimum justice,
however, there must be some areas of power controlled solely by the Maori.
Perhaps such powers will eventually evolve from the Runanga Iwi Act, or as
a function of the Waitangi Tribunal. If the government negotiates the form
and limits of Maori rights and powers openly, all concerned parties can have
sufficient influence to ensure a practical system. It does not make sense for
a government to exert control over areas that concern only the indigenous
populace unless its intent is to keep that populace subservient.
Without legislation, the government of New Zealand does not bind
itself to its own promises, and mistrust results. The common law concepts
discussed above are one means of redress available to the Maori until
legislation is passed, but they are by no means certain. Time will also make
the Maori voice stronger, if the prediction of growth in the Maori population
is accurate. It may be optimistic, but there is evidence to suggest that the
New Zealand government will not wait until it is forced to act.
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